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# Stock Selection: Research and Results April 2017 Passive Aggressive Behavior Part II: The ETF Scorecard

Smart Beta, The New Dumb Money?

- Indexing has all the momentum right now. Like a March Madness bracket-buster, Team Passive is riding a hot hand and with each passing round the field of active stock pickers is ruthlessly culled. Surely it's only a matter of time before the upstart Indexers cut down the net under a shower of confetti? Maybe, but we've still got a timeout to burn before the final whistle.
- Passive investing's big advantage is that it gets to call itself the benchmark, meaning by definition it can't underperform. That's true for the cap-weighted index of course, but not for the \$480 billion invested in smart beta ETFs, that now account for almost 30% of U.S. equity ETF assets. In that space the building blocks may be passive, but picking which of the 300-plus shrink-wrapped strategies to bet on is a very active decision. A fairer measure of the success of smart beta is to use a similar scorecard to the one often used to evaluate active managers: the share of products that actually outperformed the S&P 500 in a given quarter.
- On that basis smart beta looks a bit ho-hum. Since the first quarter of 2008 exactly half of U.S. equity smart beta ETFs beat the market each quarter on average. Over the past five years the win rate fell to 46% and in the last three it was 42%. In the first two months of 2017 only a third of smart beta ETFs have bested the market.

#### The Perils of a Good Price Chart

- The basic problem facing smart beta is chart-chasing behavior by end-users, and the ETF manufacturers for that matter. The previously red-hot low volatility trade makes an excellent case study. Since 2011 the major low volatility ETFs have marginally outperformed the market on an asset-weighted basis. But the average *investor* in the products has underperformed by (150) basis points per year. That's because the bulk of the flows into the ETFs came when the price chart looked fantastic, like in Q1 and Q2 of last year for example. In investing as in life, if something looks too good to be true it usually is.
- Unfortunately, low volatility isn't an isolated example. In the post-Crisis era stocks from the REITs and utilities sectors have been the most-heavily owned by passive products, because their dividend yields screen well for the plethora of yield-orientated smart beta ETFs that were all the rage during the bond bull market. But since the middle of last year those sectors have seen the largest outflows. On the flipside, the biggest inflows in the past eight months have been directed towards the cyclicals, led by financials, capital goods, and the commodities complex. The problem is always the same: the average ETF user is late to just about every party.

#### Learn to Spot Passive Aggressive Behavior

- For fundamental stock pickers the poor style-timing ability of ETF users is an opportunity. Stocks owned by ETFs with big *inflows* in the prior quarter tend to *underperform* over the following year. Conversely, stocks held by ETFs with outflows outperform on average. In other words, there's empirical evidence that the new dumb money is investors who overtrade ETFs, often of the sector or smart beta variety, in pursuit of whatever the trending #tradeoftheday is, be it low volatility, cyber security, robotics, or some other pre-packaged story. There's always something out there with a killer price chart and an exciting plotline.
- In past five years stocks that screened in the most expensive quintile of our valuation framework *and* were heavily owned by hot ETFs underperformed the market by almost (8) percentage points over the next 12 months. Appendix 1 on page 13 presents the current list, which includes the likes of SVB Financial, Atmos Energy, FactSet Research Systems, Brown & Brown, Westar Energy, and PTC.

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### **Conclusions in Brief**

• Smart beta's scorecard isn't much better than that for active managers...



 Smart beta ETFs with big inflows tend to reverse in the next quarter...



• Stocks held by ETFs with large inflows tend to underperform...



#### • ...Particularly this year:



#### • ...Because ETF inventors are dismal style-timers:







# Passive Aggressive Behavior Part II: The ETF Scorecard

#### Smart Beta, The New Dumb Money?

Over the past decade active equity managers have been trapped in a cruel, twisted version of a March Madness bracket, fighting to be among the last stock pickers standing as the unrelenting rise of passive investing culls the field with each passing round. The indexers, it seems, have all the momentum in their court; they're on a 10-0 run and the crowd, sensing a rout, is baying for the coup de grâce. Luckily we've still got a timeout in our pocket.

We wrote last year on the impact that passive products are having on fundamentally-focused stock pickers.<sup>1</sup> What stood out in that work was that stocks with high passive ownership and a good price chart actually tend to *under-perform* over the following year (see Exhibit 1). In part that's because a lot of what is called passive investing isn't passive at all, rather it's an active allocation to any number of the shrink-wrapped "passive" strategies now on offer (see Exhibit 2). The growth of the smart beta space has been rapid and it now accounts for something close to 30% of all U.S. equity ETF assets, in total about \$480 billion spread across more than 300 products (see Exhibit 3). By comparison actively-managed U.S. equity mutual funds still control ten times that amount.



Source: FactSet Research Systems, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Source: Strategic Insight Simfund, Empirical Research Partners Analysis. <sup>1</sup> Excluding levered ETFs, inverse ETFs, and target date ETFs.



Source: Strategic Insight Simfund, Empirical Research Partners Analysis. <sup>1</sup> Excluding levered ETFs, inverse ETFs, and target date ETFs.



<sup>1</sup> Stock Selection: Research and Results December 2016. "Passive Aggressive Behavior: The Impact of Passive Investors on Stock Selection."

With so many sugary treats to pick from ETF investors in aggregate have shown the same cravings as most other investors: they chase recent performance, ultimately to their detriment.<sup>2</sup> It turns out their behavior is also detrimental on average for the stocks that get caught up in whatever the trending #tradeoftheday happens to be. In this report we build on our previous research by digging deeper into the behavioral biases of ETF investors and the implications for the stocks enmeshed in their trades.

There's been a lot of discussion in recent years about the so-called active manager scorecard, the percent of managers ahead of their benchmarks. In the post-Crisis era it's mostly been tough slog for stock pickers. But passive shouldn't get a free pass simply by calling itself the benchmark. Apart from the cap-weighted index, the rest of what is often called passive investing still involves an active allocation decision at some point, for example in choosing the right mix of smart beta exposures.

Given that, it's only fair to construct a scorecard for passive products too, which we've done for U.S. equity ETFs, splitting the universe into those we judge to be smart beta and the rest (see Exhibits 4, overleaf, and 5). So far 2017 has proved difficult for the majority of the ETFs in both buckets, and over time there's been a general deterioration in the share of products beating the S&P 500 (see Exhibit 6). The numbers are still better than active, but the fact the hit rate has slipped below 50% is symptomatic of the biggest challenge for ETFs: chart-chasing behavior by users.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Portfolio Strategy June 2015. "Smart Beta, Dumb Money?"

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For example, consider the net new money flows into various flavors of smart beta in the four quarters ending in Q2 of last year (see Exhibit 7 overleaf). Over that period low volatility ETFs were hotter than Hamilton tickets, more than doubling their asset base in the space of a year. But Exhibit 8 (overleaf) shows the share of ETFs in each category that outperformed from that point onwards, i.e., from the start of Q3 last year through to the end of February this year. Most of what had a good price chart and good flows in the middle of last year reversed thereafter. Now ETFs flows have started to swing around to reflect a different leadership (see Exhibit 9).

Of course, this particular example has everything to do with the breakdown in the bond-proxy trade after rates bottomed midway through last year. That rotation wrong-footed plenty of non-ETF investors too, and such dramatic turning points don't come along every day. The real question is whether ETF investors are *consistently* behind the curve as they chase the latest-and-greatest, or whether this is just an isolated incident. Unfortunately the empirical evidence points mostly to the former.





Source: Strategic Insight Simfund, Empirical Research Partners Analysis. <sup>1</sup> Net new money flows from Q3 2016 through February 2017 scaled by total assets at end of Q2 2016. Numbers in parentheses denote total assets under management and number of ETFs in each category.

Source: Strategic Insight Simfund, Empirical Research Partners Analysis. <sup>1</sup> Based on total returns.

Exhibit 10 shows the share of ETFs outperforming the S&P 500 each quarter, depending on whether the ETF had big inflows or outflows in the prior quarter. For the smart beta products, shown in the grey bars, there's evidence of performance-chasing: the ETFs with top-quintile flows in the last quarter were less likely to beat the index in the following quarter, whereas those with bottom-quintile flows (i.e., outflows) were more likely to subsequently outperform. That's consistent with a recent academic paper that looked at things on a monthly frequency and found that the ETFs with the most new shares created each month (i.e., biggest inflows) tended to underperform the most in the next month (see Exhibit 11).

These results shouldn't come as any surprise whatsoever. After all, there's plenty of empirical evidence that *mutual fund* investors have always had performance-chasing tendencies (see Exhibits 12 and 13). There's almost always a performance gap between the buy-and-hold returns of mutual funds and the returns realized by actual investors, the difference being their (lack of) timing ability: inevitably they buy in when the price chart is too good to be true and sell out at the point of maximum pain. Now the same ideas have been packaged up in products with a real-time price chart and the instant gratification of a single buy/sell button. If anything we'd expect chart-chasing to be even more pronounced in ETFs than mutual funds. Liquidity isn't an unalloyed good.

#### How Many Factors Does it Take to Make Sausage?

Even if we can convince ourselves that smart beta investors will somehow resist the temptation to buy whatever has a good price chart, there's a further problem that exacerbates trend-chasing: it's almost impossible to launch an ETF that doesn't have a good backtest. We took a look at the performance of ETFs conditioned by how long they'd been listed at each point in time (see Exhibit 14). As the right-hand bars show, more recently-listed ETFs have generally been a poor bet, for example if one had consistently bought only the ETFs that had been listed for less than a year at the time of purchase only 42% of them would have outperformed the S&P 500 on average.

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All Funds

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Strategies." Working Paper.

Growth Fund

By Style

Buy-and-Hold

Value Funds

Guide to Generating Poor Returns While Investing in Successful

Random Timing

Source: Hsu, J., Myers, B., and Ryan Whitby, 2014. "Timing Poorly: A

<sup>1</sup> Asset-weighted average return of all mutual funds in each category,

Small-Cap Funds Large-Cap Funds By Size

□Actual Investors

Memo: S&P 500

Exhibit 12: U.S. Equity Mutual Funds

and Allocation Strategy

1991 Through 2013

Pre-Fee Returns Realized by Type of Manager

Monthly Data Compounded to Annual Periods



Source: Brown, D., Davies, S., and Matthew Ringgenberg, 2016. "ETF Arbitrage and Return Predictability." Working Paper.

<sup>1</sup> Limited to ETFs with greater than \$50 million in assets. Mature ETFs are those where creation/redemption activity occurs on at least half the trading days in a month.

<sup>2</sup> Alpha is the equally-weighted return of each quintile portfolio after controlling for the market, size, price-to-book, and momentum.



That hit rate is only likely to get worse for one simple reason: much like the Manhattan dating scene all the good single-factor ETFs are already taken. The first mover advantage in launching an ETF is so big that it's really hard to be the fourth or fifth, say, dividend yield ETF to the party. As a result ETF manufacturers have started adding factors to differentiate their offerings (see Exhibit 15). For example, in the previously red-hot low volatility space the two incumbents (USMV and SPLV) dominate, so it's hard to find room for a new offering unless you add a twist. In this case the next ETF to come along, SPHD, added high dividend yield to the mix (see Exhibit 16). The only thing better than one good price chart is two! All joking aside, the point is that every new factor that's added is one additional degree of freedom that can be used to smooth out the backtested chart until it rises majestically from the low-er-left to upper-right of a glossy PowerPoint slide.

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#### Don't Blame the Tools

Who uses these ETFs? On the retail side RIAs have become the largest channel (see Exhibit 17). As we've discussed in our *Future of the Money Management Industry* research series, RIAs now tend to see themselves more as asset- or style-allocators rather than stock pickers, and ETFs are often their tool of choice in that new role (see Exhibit 18).<sup>3</sup> The risk is that RIAs, with a plethora of shiny new tools to choose from, end up reaching for the hottest charts.



Institutional investors have also embraced ETFs and in a recent survey conducted at the start of the year almost 40% said they use ETFs (see Exhibit 19). Among the institutions that do use ETFs, low volatility products were the most popular, followed closely by dividend funds (see Exhibit 20). So whether these players are completely immune from performance-chasing behavior is also debatable.

In fact, in aggregate the buyers of low volatility ETFs have been rather poor style-timers (see Exhibit 21). Since 2011 when the first major low volatility ETF was launched, the money-weighted relative return for low volatility ETFs is negative even though the products themselves have marginally outperformed over that period. That's because the bulk of the money piled in during Q1 and Q2 of last year, right when the chart looked fantastic but also right before rates bottomed. It's also when the stocks represented in the ETFs were trading at their highest relative P/E ratios (see Exhibit 22).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Future of the Money Management Industry November 2016. "The Retail Business: Hard Rain."



Source: Greenwich Associates 2016 U.S. Exchange-Traded Funds Study <sup>1</sup> Based on 118 respondents in 2015 and 148 in 2016.



Source: Strategic Insight Simfund, Empirical Research Partners Analysis. <sup>1</sup> Includes USMV, SPLV, and SPHD.

<sup>2</sup> Money-weighted return approximates the return realized by actual investors, based on the timing of their allocations and withdrawals. Calculation assumes all inflows or outflows occur in the middle of each quarter.



Source: Greenwich Associates 2016 U.S. Exchange-Traded Funds Study. <sup>1</sup> Based on 55 respondents surveyed between October 2016 and January 2017.



Source: Strategic Insight Simfund, Empirical Research Partners Analysis. <sup>1</sup> Trailing-P/E is based on aggregate holdings of USMV and SPLV and is relative to the cap-weighted large-cap market.

Buy high and sell low is rarely the secret to investing success but it's surprisingly easy to do when trading an abstraction like an ETF. Most retail investors don't have the means to aggregate the cash flows of all the real-world businesses they're buying a claim over, and thus have little to go on other than the price chart of the ETF itself. Unfortunately, low volatility products aren't an isolated example. Investors tend to be their own worst enemy even in boring, cap-weighted ETFs like the ubiquitous SPY. A recent academic paper found that the gap between the buyand-hold return for the SPY and the actual S&P 500 return has averaged close to a quarter of a percent per annum (see Exhibit 23). In other words, actual investors in aggregate suffered a (25) basis point drag each year because of their poor market-timing. That doesn't sound that big, but it's still three times the management fee. In the quest for ever-lower fees the low-hanging fruit might be for investors to examine how they actually use the tools on offer.

#### Implications for Stock Pickers

Passions run hot on both sides of the indexing aisle, but the reality is that passive investing is here to stay whether one likes it or not. What we really care about is the impact the shifting landscape has on long-term, fundamentally-driven investing. We've already seen that price trends can be unreliable when there's heavy passive ownership in a stock (recall Exhibit 1). But why? Do the flows into and out of the ETFs that hold a stock somehow play a role?

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To answer that question we married data on quarterly ETF flows from the Strategic Insight Simfund database with ETF holdings data collected by FactSet. That allowed us allocate the net new money flows into (or out of) an ETF to the individual stocks held by the ETF, in proportion to each stock's weight in the fund. For a given stock at the end of each quarter we added up the flows generated by all the ETFs holding that stock and scaled by either market capitalization or dollar trading volume over the quarter. In essence, these metrics measure the magnitude of ETF-induced buying or selling in the stock over the prior quarter. Because ETF flows in our database are reported around a week after the quarter-end we apply a one month lag on our factors in all backtesting analysis to eliminate the risk of a look-ahead bias.

Exhibit 24 shows the relative returns to stocks in the highest and lowest quintile of each ETF flow metric, from 2010 to the present. On average stocks with high ETF flows in the prior quarter underperformed by about a point over the following year, see the first two grey bars. Meanwhile, stocks held by ETFs with big outflows outperformed, see the first two black bars.



It's interesting to note that the results are quite different from simply sorting the stocks based on their price momentum over the prior quarter, as shown in the third set of bars. Stocks with a good price trend in the prior three months on average continued to outperform, the opposite of what happened to stocks with large ETF inflows. So it's not the case that ETF flows are simply another proxy for past stock performance. In fact, stocks in the highest quintile of net new money flows-to-market capitalization outperformed on average by +3.6% in the *prior* year, which is moderate compared to stocks with high price momentum (see Exhibit 25).

immediately upon quarter end.

It turns out ETF flows are more deterministic of future performance than price momentum. The grey bars in Exhibit 26 show the year-ahead relative returns for stocks in the highest quintile of ETF flows, contingent on the stock's price momentum. All the grey bars are negative, meaning that on average it didn't matter what the stock's past performance looked like, if it had big ETF inflows it unperformed over the next year regardless. On the hand, stocks with low ETF flows (i.e., outflows) outperformed on average, except when the price trend was in the worst quintile. So by and large it was last quarter's ETF action that influenced the stock's future performance, not the past performance of the stock itself.



We also noticed that ETF flows are different from simply looking at changes in the level of passive ownership in a stock (see Exhibit 27). The direction is mostly the same, meaning rising passive ownership is bad for future returns and declining passive ownership is good, but the magnitude of the alpha is much reduced. That's probably because the level of passive ownership can change for many reasons, for example it could rise if an ETF that doesn't hold the stock rebalances and adds the stock. In other words, the change in passive ownership isn't a pure measure of investor demand. That suggests it really is the trend-chasing behavior of passive investors that holds the key.

However, the *level* of passive ownership has itself been a *positive* signal over the period we studied, and a fairly powerful one at that (see Exhibit 28). On face value that's vexing. How can a high level of passive ownership *and* outflows both precede future outperformance? Part of the answer lies in the sector biases embedded in stocks with high passive ownership.



We showed in our previous research that utilities and REITs are disproportionately represented in the highest quintile of passive ownership (see Exhibit 29). Currently the average REIT scores close to the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of passive ownership across all stocks, see the right-most grey bar in the chart, and the average utilities stock isn't far behind in Empirical Research Partners 10 the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile. Meanwhile the stocks from those two sectors have recently seen big outflows from the ETFs that hold them, see the black bars. That's no surprise given the post-election rotation towards financials and cyclicals, shown on the right-hand side of the chart.

Despite that rotation, the average level of passive ownership in REITs and utilities has been remarkably steady over time (see Exhibits 30 and 31). So tracking the performance of stocks with high passive ownership is a little misleading because it's consistently skewed towards those two sectors. Nonetheless, repeating the analysis on a sectorneutral basis reveals a similar result; even after controlling sector biases the stocks with high passive ownership outperformed (see Exhibit 32). That suggest that there are two different forces at work here. The first is the steady drip of money into passive products, the proverbial tide that lifts all boats, or in this case all boats with already-high passive ownership. The second force is higher-turnover, hot money ETF investors who belatedly chase whatever strategy has a good price chart and act as a contrarian signal because they're usually late to the party.



#### Conclusion: Learn to Spot Passive Aggressive Behavior

For active managers the second story has a nice ring to it: the new dumb money overtrades ETFs and chases the latest buzzworthy story to the point of excess, thereby driving up the valuations of the stocks held by hot ETFs and ultimately setting the stage for a reversal. There's only one problem with that plotline: the aggregate flows in ETFs are tiny in the grand scheme of things. Exhibit 33 shows the average net new money flows-to-market cap for each sector. For REITs, the sector most heavily owned by passive investors, the ETF flows over an entire year amount to less than one percent of the average stock's market capitalization. Even for stocks in the highest quintile of flows, annual ETF creation and redemption only amounts to about 1.3% of capitalization on average (see Exhibit 34). So even for top-quintile stocks the ETF flows don't seem to be big enough to really matter.



To put things in context, we computed the total dollar turnover of large-capitalization stocks in the first two months of this year (see Exhibit 35). Already about \$6 trillion has changed hands, or about 24% of the market's capitalization. The almost-invisible black bar in the chart shows the absolute value of all flows in U.S. equity ETFs over the same period, which adds up to a negligible \$75 billion. However, direct flows are only part of the story. The trading of the ETF units themselves on the secondary market, shown in the white bar, is nearly a third as large as the stock-level volume, big enough to matter.

That's because ETF turnover in the secondary market is quite high, which is inconsistent with the notion that ETFs mainly used for long-term allocations. In recent years the median smart beta ETF has turned over its capitalization about one-and-a-half times per year while non-smart beta turnover has been over two times (see Exhibit 36). In fact, tactical trading of sector and smart beta ETFs has become so prevalent that collectively their dollar impact now in the same ballpark as the turnover of traditional long managers or hedge funds (see Exhibit 37). These are tectonic forces we're dealing with so knowing which ETFs are involved in the stocks you care about isn't just a nice-to-know, it's basic risk management.



Here's once example: in recent years stocks in the most-expensive quintile of our valuation framework have underperformed by almost (8) percentage points over the next 12 months, when they also had big ETF inflows in the prior quarter (see Exhibit 38). It seems ETFs are a convenient way to spot areas of the market that might have become overvalued, and even if ETF flows don't *cause* that overvaluation per se, they help us sniff it out. The bottom line is we think there's enough evidence to suggest that passive investors are worth keeping an eye on; they can act as a signpost pointing to parts of the market where things are too good to be true.



' Measured one-way.

<sup>2</sup> Including the equity portion of target date and balanced funds. Appendix 1 below sorts stocks in the highest quintile of valuation by their ETF flows. Stocks at the top are those deemed overvalued by our model that have also seen big inflows into the ETFs that hold them. We'd exercise some

Appendix 1 below sorts stocks in the highest quintile of valuation by their ETF flows. Stocks at the top are those deemed overvalued by our model that have also seen big inflows into the ETFs that hold them. We'd exercise some caution when dabbling in these issues.

#### Appendix1: Large-Capitalization Stocks The Highest Quintile of Valuation and Highest Two Quintiles of Net New ETF Money Flows-to-Capitalization Sorted by Net New ETF Money Flows-to-Capitalization As of Early-April 2017

			ċ	wnership Factors			Super Fa	ctors			-		
				Mark Marris			wnership Factors Super Factors						
Symbol	Company	Price	Net New ETF Money Flows-to- Capitalization	ETF Money Flows-to- Capitalization (5-Big. Inflows)	Level of Passive Ownership (5-Highest)	Valuation	Capital	Earnings Quality and Trend	Market	Core Model Rank	Forward P/E- Patio	YTD Returns	Market Capitalization
SIV/R	SVB EINANCIAL CROUP	\$182.03	0.46 %	(J=Dig IIII0 W3)	(J=Highest)	5	4	na	1	2	21.1 ×	66 %	\$96
ATO	ATMOS ENERGY CORP	79.65	0.39	5	5	5	4	3	2	5	27.2	8.0	84
FDS	FACTSET RESEARCH SYSTEMS INC	162.35	0.35	5	4	5	2	na	3	4	21.8	(0.4)	6.4
BRO	BROWN & BROWN INC	41.62	0.35	5	4	5	2	na	4	5	22.0	(6.9)	5.8
W/P	WESTAR ENERGY INC	54.60	0.32	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	21.6	(2.4)	7.8
PTC	PTC INC	51.86	0.31	5	4	5	5	5	1	4	39.6	12.1	6.0
ACC	AMERICAN CAMPUS COMMUNITIES	48.03	0.30	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	54.9	(2.7)	6.4
TRMR	TRIMBLE INC	31.27	0.27	5	4	5	3	2	3	3	23.2	37	7.9
TEY	TELEFLEY INC	102.03	0.27	5	4	5	4	2	2	4	23.8	10.0	87
MSCI	MSCLINC	96.59	0.27	5	4	5	1	na	2	3	27.1	23.0	8.8
DRE	DUKE REALTY CORP.	26.68	0.26	5	5	5	4	2	2	4	86.1	1.2	9.5
SEIC	SELINVESTMENTS CO	50.00	0.26	5	4	5	2	na	3	5	22.6	13	8.0
RMD	RESMED INC	70.55	0.25	5	4	5	2	5	3	4	23.9	14.2	10.0
CROF	CROE HOLDINGS INC	80.89	0.24	5	4	5	3	na	2	5	25.6	9.8	9.0
CONY	COGNEX CORP	83.87	0.24	5	4	5	4	3	1	4	44 1	32.0	73
WOOF	VCAINC	91 5 7	0.21	5	4	5	5	5	1	4	28.2	33.4	7.5
CPRT	COPARTINC	59.96	0.21	5	3	5	5	2	2	3	220.2	82	69
WST	WEST PHARMACEUTICAL SVSC INC	80.82	0.20	5	5	5	5	3	3	5	323	(4.6)	5.9
WWAV	WHITEWAVE FOODS CO	56.19	0.10	5	4	5	5	5	3	5	36.1	(4.0)	10.0
MKTY	MARKETAYESS HOLDINGS INC	185.87	0.15	5	4	5	2	na	4	5	46.7	26.7	7.0
	DOMINO'S PIZZA INC	18636	0.18	5	4	5	3	2	1	2	35.8	173	9.0
	LENINGY INTERNATIONAL INC	165.87	0.18	5	4	5	4	2	3	4	21.0	86	7.1
ALCN		115.61	0.17	5	3	5	5	1	1	3	38.8	20.3	93
REC	RECENCY CENTERS CORP	66.35	0.16	5	5	5	4	5	5	5	38.7	(3.1)	113
AMD		1416	0.10	2	1	5	4	1	1	5	100.0	24.0	12.2
MD		14.10	0.14	4	4	5	1	2		2	121	24.5	76
		197.90	0.14	4	2	5	5	2	2	5	109.9	4.2	21.0
		91.24	0.12	4	2	5	1	1	1	1	103.3	125	20.7
CUV		6 2 2	0.10	4	5	5	5	1		2	9.4	(10.0)	29.7
WW	WEVERLARE ENERGY CORF	22.06	0.10	4	2	5	5	1	2	5	25.0	(10.0)	25.4
SVMC	SVMANTEC CORP.	20.20	0.10	4	5	5	5	4	2	1	177	275	23.4
COC		2458	0.10	4	4	5	4	2	1	4	20.0	27.3	11.0
		24.30	0.09	4	4	5	4	5	4	4	59.0	5.5	11.4
	NEWEIELD EXPLORATION CORP	3714	0.09	4	5	5	2	1	5	5	10.0	(9.0)	40.9
NEX	NEWFIELD EXPLORATION CO	37.14	0.08	4	4	5	5		5	5	19.0	(8.3)	7.4
MON	MONSANTO CO	114.75	0.08	4	3	5	4	4	4	2	23.2	9.6	50.3
EUG	EUG RESUURCES INC	98.25	0.08	4	5	5	3	1	3	3	/8.3	(2.7)	50./
Source	a: Empirical Pasaarch Part	52.02	lucic	4	2	5	2	2		2	24.4	13.0	17.0